Thai junta in search of an exit strategy

The Straits Times, March 31, 2007
By Thitinan Pongsudhirak


Gen Sonthi (above) has resorted to doing what he knows best...He knows that he must find a way to get off the stage with the restoration of democratic rule, and with his political safety and that of all the CNS generals ensured.








WITH six months gone and as many months to go after it took power in a military coup with a promise to return to democratic rule within a year, Thailand's ruling junta, known as the Council for National Security (CNS), is caught in a bind searching for an exit strategy.

The CNS is bound by its pledge to hold a general election towards the end of the year after a new Constitution is promulgated. However, the election is almost certain to return to parliament mostly the same faces from deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's former Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party.

For the CNS generals, staging the poll will risk retribution from Mr Thaksin's supporters and loyalists, to say nothing of the prospect of a political comeback by Mr Thaksin himself. Yet putting off the election will incur the wrath of civil society groups and political parties clamouring for the restoration of democratic rule.

Just as the generals are being squeezed by this quandary, they are turning up the heat on Mr Thaksin as anti-graft agencies churn out a host of corruption indictments against him and his family members.

As things stand, Thai politics is still mired in prolonged and protracted instability. The second half of this year - when a Constitution is effected to herald the long-awaited election, and by which time the CNS is supposed to cede power to elected politicians - appears headed for another major round of political confrontation and turmoil not too different from what was witnessed last year.

One sticking point will be the impending mandatory retirement in September of General Sonthi Boonyarataglin, the junta chief. Although he can remain CNS leader, Gen Sonthi will have to step down from his army command. The recent military reshuffle which saw his loyalists elevated to key commands suggests the junta leader is acutely aware of his future vulnerabilities. Having led the Sept 19 coup last year, Gen Sonthi is increasingly engaged in the business of self-preservation.

As he looks for ways to step aside safely after the return of democratic rule, Gen Sonthi's political role has become much more assertive and forceful, and all the more conspicuous in view of the government's dismal performance under Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont. Indeed, it now appears that the CNS, as opposed to the Surayud government, is increasingly in charge of Thailand's immediate future.

Gen Sonthi's latest ploys have been expedient and familiar. He has played the nationalist card to simultaneously whip up anti-Thaksin and pro-military sentiments. Known for his soft-spoken disposition, he initially seemed inert and rudderless in the aftermath of the coup. He was accused of dithering and vacillating about what to do with Mr Thaksin and how to restore democratic rule. But such indecisiveness and aloofness are no longer hallmarks of his reign.

The army chief recently went on a speaking circuit, no longer mincing his words. In an address to local officials at the district and village levels, he told them to press on in the service of the country and not to be afraid of Mr Thaksin's return.

Shortly thereafter, he urged officials in a speech at the Justice Ministry to proceed full speed ahead with the prosecution of corruption cases involving Mr Thaksin and his cronies. Many bureaucrats have been lethargic in their work in the post-coup interim period, especially in digging up dirt on Mr Thaksin, partly because they are mindful that he may seek revenge should he return to power.

Increasingly coy about his political endgame, Gen Sonthi has indicated that the political scene will be clearer by May when the Constitutional Court is due to rule on the dissolution of the TRT and Democrat parties, along with three other minor parties. His hint of the May date has led to rumours that the TRT party is to be dissolved.

The TRT has already suffered from a host of defections. The party's dissolution would decimate Mr Thaksin's political vehicle and further complicate his return to politics. It would also realign the political party system, as former TRT MPs would be forced to find new banners to run under in the upcoming election. Yet, keeping the TRT off-balance and preventing Mr Thaksin's political re-entry is just one part of Gen Sonthi's strategy.

Last month, in a speech to a 1,200-strong audience from diverse social groups, Gen Sonthi categorically stated that he wanted to reclaim Thailand's 'national treasure' from foreign companies, in an apparent reference to the Shin Corp satellites that the Thaksin family sold to Temasek Holdings. Although it was vague and unsubstantiated, Gen Sonthi suggested that reclaiming the satellites was an appeal to Thai nationalism. Opinion polls later revealed overwhelming public support for the proposal.

By stoking nationalist sentiments - martial music is now being promoted on the army's extensive broadcast media networks - Gen Sonthi has resorted to doing what he knows best, thereby boosting his personal popularity at a critical juncture ahead of his mandatory retirement. He knows he must find a way to get off the stage with the restoration of democratic rule, and with his political safety and that of all the CNS generals ensured. He has deemed the nationalist card to be his best bet.

Taken together with the government's inept handling of its stated two-pronged policy platform of national reconciliation and sufficiency economy, Gen Sonthi's nationalist call does not bode well for Thailand's policy direction, nor does it presage any near-term political settlement. In fact, it risks drawing Thailand deeper into its quagmire of unpredictable political outcomes and unreliable economic policymaking. It is also likely to prolong Thailand's murky political environment and investment landscape up to and after the election.

Halfway into the post-coup interim period, it is now reasonable to postulate that the putsch did not deliver what it promised. Mr Thaksin and his cronies are not finished politically. The coup leaders have installed a most disappointing Prime Minister and a weak Cabinet with few policy achievements on display. The new Constitution being drafted appears problematic and may have to be aborted if it is deemed unable to pass the referendum. Whenever it takes place, the election will not resolve Thailand's deep-seated polarisation, catalysed even further by the ongoing crisis.

As their plans for saving themselves politically increasingly take centre stage, Gen Sonthi and his CNS generals must tread carefully. Their desire for a safe exit is understandable. But it will be unpalatable to most Thais if their exit strategy ends up holding Thailand's return to democratic rule hostage.

The writer is director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.