Singapore's bilateral relations - The paranoia of suspicious minds

The Straits Times, June 1, 2007
By Janadas Devan, Senior Writer


SINGAPORE-Indonesia as well as Singapore-Malaysia relations took positive turns recently, thanks to the efforts of the top leaders of the three countries.

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's summit meeting with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono produced an Extradition Treaty as well as a Defence Cooperation Agreement between the two countries. And Mr Lee's Pulau Langkawi retreat with his Malaysian counterpart Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi resulted in an agreement to form a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) to discuss collaboration in Johor's Iskandar Development Region (IDR).

But the positive moods these bilateral summits produced did not last long. Government-to-government relations remain upbeat, but popular sentiments in both Indonesia and Malaysia, as reflected in their media and in their political debates, have continued to be churlish.

It is important to understand why official policy and popular sentiment should diverge in this fashion. Singaporeans, ever hopeful, must understand that political leaders in both Indonesia and Malaysia face domestic constraints. Those constraints will affect not only bilateral relations but also Asean economic integration. The existential challenges that China and India present to the region may not in themselves be sufficient to foster a forward-looking regionalism in Asean.

Consider the aftermath of the Lee-Abdullah 'durian diplomacy'. Mr Lee, at the press conference announcing the formation of the JMC, had described it as a 'consultative' body. He used the correct adjective. Ministers on both sides of the Causeway will consult on how Singapore might cooperate with Malaysia to help make the IDR a success. A body to foster such consultations has to be, by definition, 'consultative'.

It is impossible to believe that educated Malaysians do not know that a 'consultative' body cannot possibly have executive powers. After all, Malaysia itself has had consultative bodies before - including the famous National Consultative Council (NCC). That was formed in January 1970, in the aftermath of the 1969 race riots, to involve various groups, including opposition parties, in the effort to find 'permanent solutions to our racial problems', as a contemporary report put it.

Everyone, including opposition politicians, knew the NCC had no executive powers. That was vested in the National Operations Council, led by then-deputy prime minister Tun Abdul Razak. He was prepared to consult all and sundry, but nobody doubted that his willingness to do so did not imply his ceding control over 'operations'. No Malaysian, not even the non- English speaking ones, confused the National Consultative Council with the National Operations Council.

So how is it possible for someone like Mr A. Kadir Jasin, a former group editor- in-chief of Malaysia's New Straits Times Press, to suggest that the Malaysia-Singapore JMC may affect Malaysia's sovereignty? It cannot possibly be because he thinks Mr Lee's use of the word 'consultative' means that the JMC will be a bilateral 'operations council'. Mr Kadir, a crisp writer in English, is too smart to believe such nonsense.

But he, like many others in Malaysia, have raised this canard because, one, it carries a political percentage on the ground, and two, because they genuinely fear globalisation. The ridiculous fuss over the JMC's purpose is a stand-in for a generalised fear that the policies that must be put in place to ensure the IDR's success will threaten entrenched privileged domestic groups.

Thus, the Malaysian government's decision to exempt investors in some IDR sectors from the requirement that they find bumiputera partners for their ventures is attacked as a betrayal of the rakyat. Thus, the proposal that Singaporeans who work in the IDR be allowed unfettered access to the area is attacked as a sellout of Malaysia's sovereignty. Singapore is just a symbol of globalisation in this debate; the symbol has to be traduced because it is the substance of globalisation that is feared.

Prime Minister Abdullah and his senior colleagues understand what is at stake. They know that China and India are breathing down Asean's neck. They have a clear-sighted vision of how the IDR should function if it is to succeed. But that understanding, knowledge and vision run counter to what plays on the ground. This is a contradiction that Singapore cannot possibly resolve, no matter how much goodwill it manifests. The IDR, if it thrives, will benefit both countries, but only Malaysians can ensure its success.

Singapore-Indonesia relations has run up against a similar contradiction. For a brief moment, after the extradition and defence cooperation pacts were signed, there was euphoria. Indonesia has scored a tremendous victory in persuading Singapore to sign the extradition treaty, Indonesian commentators declared almost unanimously. Perhaps the ban on the export of Indonesian sand to Singapore worked after all, they speculated. Singapore, which has benefited from corrupt Indonesians depositing their wealth in the island, will now be forced to hand over these criminals, they said. Great victory for Indonesia!

But the commentators could not quite believe their own propaganda. The euphoria was soon succeeded by suspicion. If Singapore was happy to sign these agreements, it must be because these cunning Singaporeans saw an advantage in doing so. And if the agreements are advantageous to Singapore, they must be disadvantageous to Indonesia. And lo and behold, the defence cooperation pact became Exhibit A: See, Singapore accepted the extradition treaty just so it could station its military in Indonesia.

Foreign troops will 'destroy the honour and value of the nation', said one politician. The 'territorial independence of the country will be reduced', said another. With the defence agreement, 'the sea and air space of Singapore (will) increase because it (now) also includes the sea and air space of Indonesia', one newspaper thundered.

A few joint training areas, in a vast archipelago stretching across over 5,000km - roughly the distance from London to Baghdad - can harm Indonesia's territorial integrity? The Jakarta Post put its finger on the problem when it observed: 'This nation is becoming more and more xenophobic, if not paranoid.' If Indonesians were honest with themselves, it said, 'we will find this is because we cannot cope with our growing inferiority complex in the face of more advanced nations'.

President Yudhoyono supports strongly the proposed Asean Charter, seeing it as a means of taking Asean integration to a new plane. But his view runs counter to what plays on the ground. What the head tells the country's leaders does not gel with what the heart among a large segment of its population feels.

That is the root of Singapore's bilateral problems with Indonesia and Malaysia. And it is also the root of the difficulties Asean is facing in becoming an economically integrated region, able to hold its own against China and India.