Thursday, November 1, 2007

The Pedra Banca dispute

Introduction.
South East Asia has a number of international tensions, of which the latest one is the dispute for sovereignty over Pedra Branca - “the white rock” - between Singapore and Malaysia.

Situated at the entrance of the Singaporean Strait, the claiming seems to be based on its strategic position, and perhaps further onto delimitation of sea boundaries of both countries.

Singapore’s case is dependant on an Anglo – Dutch treaty signed in 1824, and on the fact that they’ve hold possession of the area after its independence in 1965. This is reinforced by the building of Horsburgh lighthouse on the rock in the mid 19th century.

On the other hand, Malaysia bases its argument of sovereignty on the foundation of the Johore-Riau-Lingga Sultanate, in the early 16th Century, which encloses the area. The issue has been troubling both countries for more than 20 years, but it only recovered its relevance until last year.

The media has had a major influence on the case, determining the nature of some of the solutions that have been attempted so far. Regardless the effort both countries have put into it, the conflict doesn’t seem to get any where near to an end.


Description of the region.
Eastern entrance of the straight of Singapore (about 14 kilometres of the Malaysian state of Johor). Malaysia’s name for the rocky outcrop is Pulau Batu Putih, while Singapore calls it Pedra Branca. Both translate into English as “White Rock”.


Origin and causes of the conflict.
The Pedra Branca dispute has surfaced at a time when the region is dealing with security threats and economic concerns, and though this is not the first factor to deteriorate the already strained relationships between the two protagonist states, it is perhaps one of the most significant.

The furor and significance of it lies on its strategic position and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, which can be drawn around the island. It allows Singapore to have access to the South China Sea, which is very important for its ships to sail. To a greater extent, the islet has been an important navigation landmark for centuries. Portuguese and Dutch records from the 17th century note it as a marking point for ships seeking to find what are now the Straits of Singapore -not an easy thing to do in narrow waters with many nearby islands, in an era before accurate maps, charts and radar were used -.

In the 1840’s the British, trying to improve navigation in waters becoming busier and more lucrative as they suppressed piracy in the area and developed the new free port of Singapore, built a lighthouse on the rocks. The lighthouse was maintained, as an aid to free and safe passage of the seas by merchant shipping of all nations, by the British port and naval authorities in the nearest harbour: Singapore.

When Singaporeans assumed responsibility for their own port and its navigation control duties, this included the lighthouse. No mention was made of this during the years of merger as part of Malaysia. No mention was made of it in the traumatic separation of 1965. Singapore quietly administered the lighthouse as an international duty until Malaysia decided in 1979 it was the sovereign power, and insisted on taking control of the tiny hunk of rock.

According to Mr. Mark Hong (Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore), Malaysia’s intentions are connected to their recent success at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Malaysia won the dispute with Indonesia over the Ligitan and Sipadan islands, and now, it is confident that its claim for Pedra Branca will be similarly successful.

There’s also some connection to the other dispute over the price of water supply to Singapore and other issues, in the sense that the bad atmosphere and suspicion can lead to anger and irritation, which has spilled over to this claim on Pedra Branca.

Is the Pedra Branca dispute part of a bigger issue or problem that is destined to plague Singapore-Malaysia relations in the near future? We cannot be sure.

Meanwhile, a number of allegations made against Singapore on a wide range of current and old issues ranging from the Asean+3 Secretariat to KD Malaya, the former Malaysian naval training base in Woodlands are being made. These complaints paint Singapore as 'insensitive', 'arrogant' and 'unneighbourly' in the conduct of its bilateral relations with Malaysia. It was also said to be 'selfish', 'profiteering' and 'legalistic'.

KD Malaya is an old issue. The Malaysians left their naval training base in Woodlands on their own accord in 1997. They chose not to take up Singapore’s offers and decided in 1992 to relocate their base to Malaysia. As for the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal, Singapore doesn’t seem to have opposed it. In fact, it was one of the first countries to come out in support of it.


Recent developments.
In such an atmosphere, the Malaysian navy and marine police vessels have escalated their intrusions into Singapore territorial waters off Pedra Branca in the past one month. It appears that Singapore does have the right to turn away Malaysian vessels that seek to approach the island , or at least until a solution is reached.

Differences in opinion have been the cause of some terrific mud-slinging on the part of the Malaysian media at its favorite target. Inflammatory remarks have included accusing Singapore of behaving like the Israelis who stole land belonging to the Palestinians.

In contrast, the Singapore camp has been “taking the dispute in its stride, retorting in a calm manner to Malaysian remarks. Such provocative actions are not only senseless but dangerous. The Malaysian Government would have to bear responsibility for the consequences caused by the aggressive and repeated intrusions of its vessels.”, as Singapore’s Prime Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong says.

Malaysia insists that Singapore’s presence on the island is solely as administrator of the lighthouse, and that it should not assume ownership rights as a result of this. Malaysia also presents as its strongest evidence, a map issued by the United States Army that depicts Pedra Branca as part of Malaysia.

Johor Menteri Besar Datuk Adbul Ghani also said that Johor has lodged several protests since 1989 against Singapore when it started to build other structures on the island.

However, in a statement released by the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore maintains that a radar facility and helipad, built in 1989 and 1991 respectively, was done so as to aid in the safety of navigation in and out of the Straits of Singapore, and that there has been no recent construction work on Pedra Branca. This may prove to be a moot point since international law dictates that acts done by disputing parties in an attempt to advance their own case after the dispute has already arisen, will not influence the final ruling.

Another Malaysian accusation has been that Singapore has delayed the process of referring the matter to the ICJ.

However Professor S. Jayakumar, Singaporean Minister for Foreign Affairs refutes this: “That’s really absurd because it was Singapore who proposed that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice way back in 1989, even though we have been exercising sovereignty over Pedra Branca for over 150 years. Now why did we do that? Because we wanted to resolve the issue, and we still want to resolve the it peacefully, without affecting bilateral relations adversely. And we are ready to make a move on this process”.


Influence of the Media.
The print media in Malaysia has been running frequent stories recently about the tension in relations with Singapore. This is nothing new, and the central issues remain familiar also. But at least one Malaysian newspaper ran a sensational headline story “War with Singapore, What if?”

Prime Minister Mahathir (Malaysia) did dismiss the recent flurry of stories, saying the issue of war was being discussed only because the media kept asking ministers about it. Unfortunately, the problem goes beyond media organizations trying to boost sales by being sensational..

On the side of the Singaporean media, the difficulties arose because Malaysia repeatedly changed its position, and shifted their goal posts each time Singapore neared an agreement.

No sooner had it agreed to a price for water when they changed their minds and upped the price. After the two countries had discussed all the issues as one package for several years at Malaysia's request, Malaysia unilaterally and without prior notice abandoned the package approach, saying that they only wanted to discuss the current price of water.

Despite all the sudden twists and turns, Singapore accommodated and persevered, never closing the door on negotiations, in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.

The Malaysian allegations against Singapore appear totally unjustified when Singapore were trying to find an amicable way forward.

Singaporean press sometimes showed that it is in the overwhelming interest of both countries to settle their differences in accordance with international law, either through the ICJ or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), or in the case of the water price revision through the method provided for in the Water Agreements themselves, that is, arbitration according to the laws of Johor.

However, the issue has been been clearly driven to war terms. In his New Year message, PM Mahathir said: 'We promise that if anyone violates our freedom, they will get what they call a 'bloody nose'.' (New Straits Times, Jan 1, 2003).

This further encouraged the Malaysian media to play up Singapore's alleged forward defense strategy and link it to Singapore's 'arrogance' in the conduct of its bilateral relations with Malaysia. This was quickly followed by remarks by various Malaysian leaders publicly emphasizing the MAF's (Malaysian Armed Forces) capability in defending Malaysia from external threats.

For instance, Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak said that the MAF had experience fighting in a real war and that sophisticated weaponry systems were not the yardstick to measure whether a country could win a war (Bernama, Jan 7, 2003).

In the same vein there were almost daily articles in the Malaysian Malay-language press playing up Singapore's alleged aggressive intentions. On Jan 18, 2003, Berita Harian (Malaysia) recklessly alleged that “Singapore has stealthily embarked on a bioterrorism defense programme, that it has set aside more than RM201 million specifically to carry out Research & Development (R&D) to build up its bioterrorism defense system”. History has proven that every country that undertakes R&D in biodefence will also end up doing R&D into weapons for biological attacks. Singapore is no exception to such thinking.'

Mr Hong responded: “Such war-mongering articles, it should be noted, are found especially in the Malay-language press, which can only be designed to stir up animosities in their Malay population against Singapore. Loose talk of war is irresponsible and dangerous. It whips up emotions that could become difficult to control”.


Resolutions attempted.
It appears that the only feasible solution was to refer the matter to the ICJ. Hence, it is perhaps wise to take a calm and rational approach to the dispute, and wait for the decision to be made.

On the case of Singapore, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is willing to release some long awaited documents that seem to stand as a strong evidence to Singapore’s position.

The minister said: “These are all documents for the record. I have been reluctant to release these documents despite misinterpretation of facts from the other side because we hoped for a win-win outcome. However, I have to release them now because this hope is no longer realistic and so much misinformation on the water issue has been put out by Malaysia that needs to be rebutted by conclusive evidence.

"This process of arbitration can determine what we have not been able to agree on, namely whether Malaysia has the right to revise the price after a lapse of 16/17 years, and if so by how much. Notwithstanding our efforts to reach an agreement, we find ourselves at this impasse.

"PM Mahathir and FM Syed Hamid had spoken about referring the water issue to international arbitration by the PCA. On Dec 28, 2002, when our media asked me about this, I said that it was a great pity that both sides have not reached agreement on the water issue. Singapore obviously could not force Malaysia to come to the negotiating table if it chooses not to do so. Hence, I said that if Malaysia proposes to submit the water issue to PCA arbitration, Singapore would have to agree, albeit reluctantly, in the interest of overcoming the impasse.

"To my surprise, their Berita Harian (Dec 30, 2002) reported FM Syed Hamid as responding that the option of referring the water issue to PCA for arbitration did not arise. If Malaysia does not wish to send the matter for arbitration to the PCA, a world organization renowned for its impartiality, then what is the next best solution?”.

In the end, The Minister of Foreign affairs’ response to media queries on Malaysian press summarise the main development and possible solution to the conflict. They report that Malaysia and Singapore will sign the Special Agreement on Pedra Branca on 6 February 2003, the MFA Spokesman said: "After considering various dates, including January 2003 dates proposed by Singapore, Singapore and Malaysia have agreed to sign the Special Agreement to refer Malaysia's claim to Pedra Branca to the ICJ on 6 February 2003 in Putrajaya " (Singapore, 9th January 2003)

So what happens after a Special Agreement has been signed by both sides?

Mr Mark Hong, on the legal process once the matter has been handed over to the ICJ: “Well both sides will present their legal documents through their legal representative who will make their cases to the charges of the ICJ panel which will then review the relative merits of the two cases and make their decision”.


Brief analysis.
After the ICJ has pronounced judgment, the reactions from both sides will definitely play a big part in future bilateral relations. So much depends on the maturity and the emotional characteristics of the respective national character.

If one side is used to the rule of law and the acceptance of rational behavior and is not prone to emotional outbursts, then it will and can calmly accept the verdict, even if it is the loser.

But the whole episode may cause a residue of bad feelings in the sense of grievances that can continue to poison bilateral relations.

It is very important for the winner to be humble and gracious and not to rub it in with inflammatory newspaper headlines and vice versa, and for the media of the losing side not to beat the nationalistic drum and make wild allegations.

If both sides wish to bring the issue to the ICJ for international arbitration, then they must be aware that there’s a possibility of loss so they must think carefully over the strategy and decide whether to take that final step or else, if they lose, they might regret having brought the issue to court. It would be great if it can be removed from the agenda of bilateral problems, and then it can create a better atmosphere for the resolution of other problems.

Nevertheless, the argument has been around ever since, surfacing now and again.

Singapore’s post-1965 success at developing itself as a viable and stable state, with a strong economy and a clear identity on the world stage, did not sit well with all Malaysians.

Bilateral relations are so close and interdependence is so strong that friction can never be completely avoided; but historical baggage and post-independence resentment do not help to reduce it.

Unfortunately, stirring up feelings over disagreements with Singapore has also been an easy temptation, for two reasons.

First, there are so many small but irritating issues available, irritating because of the still unresolved feelings, on both sides, about their shared history and subsequent experiences.

Second, a flare up often helps distract attention from internal friction or disputes. Raising a foreign issue to distract citizens from domestic problems is an ancient practice of statecraft. Sadly, Malaysia’s leaders have not been unwilling to resort to it, and the Pedra Branca issue reflects this starkly.

The fact is the Malaysian government has put itself in a bit of a bind. Using disputes with Singapore for partisan purposes is tempting but awkward, for loosing this dispute will automatically turn a useful distraction into a serious political problem, because it will then face vigorous criticism at home.

In general, Pedra Branca is a light in more ways than one. It shines clearly on one of the most powerful roots of bilateral tension: domestic politics in Malaysia and its impact on foreign policy.

It is important to mention that Malaysia has acknowledged the importance of the Water Agreements for a long time. These Agreements were signed by the Johor State Government and the Singapore City Council in 1961 and 1962 respectively.

By then, Malaysia was already an independent and sovereign nation, and Singapore had achieved self-government. For example, in 1968, three years after Singapore’s independence, the Malaysian representative to the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Mr M. O. Ariff, said: “'Some treaties might be so fundamental to the very existence of States that they simply could not be dispensed with, whatever political differences might arise. No country can evade its international treaty obligations by enacting any domestic law. This is a very well-established principle of international law".

This could be a rather dramatic vision of the situation, but it actually states that Petra Branca could play a mayor role in determining Singapore as a single and independent nation (the very existence of states), whereas Malaysia’s interest seems to rely on a lucrative basis.

Finally, peaceful and amicable settlement of disputes has been Singapore's consistent approach. For the Pedra Branca issue, they had proposed and they have agreed, to refer it to the ICJ.

However, the status quo must prevail, until a decision has been made by the ICJ. This is the right of the country who has ruled over the land to do so until a solution is achieved. This is consistent with Malaysia's own position in the case of Sipadan/Ligitan. There, Malaysia adopted the position that as they were in possession of the islands, the status quo should remain.

Malaysia now disregards the status quo in the case of Pedra Branca by intruding into Singapore waters around the island which has belonged to Singapore for more than 150 years.

However, it is assumable that it is in the overwhelming national interest of both countries to avoid escalating tensions and conflicts, as the consequences could be costly for both. Malaysia agreed to respect international law on territorial disputes and avoid any confrontation with Singapore on Pedra Branca. This is also Singapore's position.


I do not recall the source of the above article. If my memory serves me right, I think it was produced by the United World College of Southeast Asia.

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